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Abstract 
This article demonstrates the benefits of using a role theory approach in the field of International 
Political Economy (IPE) by demonstrating the benefits of role theory relative to variants of the 
social constructivist paradigm, especially vis-à-vis identity based accounts of IPE. This article also 
documents why and how role theory has always had a home in IPE even before the constructivist 
revolution in the 1990s. The social interactionist dimension in the work of Herbert Mead and his 
notion of a general other are linked to the relational ideas of friendship and impartial spectator 
present in the works of the founding father of classical political economy, Adam Smith.  These 
similar ideas about the self and their surrounding social environment is a useful starting point to 
locate role theory in IPE and demonstrate its analytical advantages within social constructivism. 
After showing the “forgotten” place role theory has always had in IPE, the article illustrates the 
potential of using a role theory approach within the field of IPE through an illustrative analysis of 
the Greek economic crisis. 
 
 











The purpose of this article is twofold, one of which is to show the analytical advantages of using 
roles vis-à-vis identity based accounts in the field of International Political Economy (IPE), 
specifically in the study of economic crises. The second purpose is to locate this approach within 
the social constructivist paradigm in the field of IPE. In fact, we claim that roles have always had 
a home in IPE even before the constructivist (identity) revolution in the 1990s. Adam Smith’s 
concepts of sympathy and impartial spectator reflect an existing relational dimension that is also 
present and similar to that of Herbert Mead and his notions of a general other in symbolic 
interactionist role theory. In other words, classical political economy made the space for role theory 
and relational interactions in IPE from which this article builds. 
However, thinking about roles has not been a pressing topic within IPE, not even in the 
case of economic crises as actors constitute a series of role relationships such as borrower-lender, 
debtor-creditor and rescued state-lender of last resort. These are not identities but roles understood 
as social positions in an organized group as well as any socially recognized category of actor 
(Stryker and Statham 1985: 323). Roles are contextually based and reflect behavioural dispositions 
of an actor. A role indicates to an external other or counterpart who the self is in that particular 
interaction, which is not necessarily the complete identity of an actor. While borrower and debtor 
may be part of a state identity as routinized practices in economic affairs, not many states will 
appreciate or claim to have the identity of a rescued or defaulter state. These rather imposed social 
categories or roles have negative social connotations and illustrate the recent social economic 
behaviour of a state both domestically and internationally. Actors try to react to such impositions 
and/or find ways to minimise their reputational damage, but above all actors try to remove such 
roles from their repertoire.  Thus, identity betrays its limitations when analysing more short term 
social interactions such as economic crises. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, the conceptual vocabulary of role 
theory is introduced to a broader audience of scholars interested in IPE. Second, we show how 
roles have always had a place within IPE by establishing conceptual links between the works of 
Adam Smith and Herbert Mead. Third, the article differentiates roles from identity further, as the 
latter is more commonly used in structural and relational constructivism as well as showing the 
potential synergies of roles and international practice theory; the latter as a form of relational 
constructivism. Fourth, we illustrate how roles contribute to a better understanding of IPE in one 
empirical application of an economic crisis. The case study deals with the EU financial crisis. It 
focuses on Greece’s roles as a borrower, debtor, rescued state, economic reformer and potential 
defaulter. It also analyses Greece’s different interactions with the EU, Germany and the IMF as 
holders of the corresponding counterroles of lender, lender of last resort, and creditor. The Greek 
case presented here covers the initial process of role interactions and does not cover the entire 
process of the financial crisis and subsequent stalemates in its relationships with its significant 
others. Our purpose is therefore to give a snapshot of the applicability of the role theory toolkit to 
IPE cases. Finally, we conclude by assessing the promise of role theory for IPE in general and 




Symbolic interactionist role theory assumes that international actors perform a set of roles through 
constant social interactions with other states and non-state actors (Breuning 2011; Harnish 2011a; 
Kaarbo and Cantir 2013: 466).1 Role theory is able to bridge the gap between agency and structure 
as roles are the result of the interaction between individuals, states or any type of actor that take 
place within an environment that constrains the actors’ choices (Aggestam 2006; Thies 2010). Yet, 
structures in symbolic interactionist role theory do not fully determine the patterns of behaviour of 
actors (Wehner 2015). Structural change is still a possibility in symbolic interactionist role theory 
as it highlights the non-reification of structures and the importance of agency (Harnish 2011b; 
McCourt 2012; Wehner 2018). Role theory also moves across the different levels of analysis, 
thereby arguably generating more comprehensive explanations for actors’ behaviours (Kaarbo and 
Cantir 2013: 467) as we explore how individual leaders fashion roles based on contestation among 
key actors in domestic society in response to challenges and opportunities presented by significant 
others in the international system. 
Since roles originate through social interactions, any existing or proposed role depends on 
a corresponding counterrole. Thus role conception involves the self’s perception of its own social 
position vis-à-vis others’ position(s) and expectations (Elgström and Smith 2006: 5). Role 
expectations are the implicit and explicit demands by others in the forms of audience cues, 
counterroles or complementary roles (Harnisch 2011a: 8). Some roles are conceived by taking the 
perspective of a specific other such as when a state like Greece takes the perspective of a specific 
lender like Germany to cast its own role as a rescued state. Other roles are nevertheless made by 
the self (ego) taking the perspective of a more abstract other (alter) and/or from cues emanating 
                                                          
1 Symbolic interactionist role theory focuses on the formation of roles at the micro-level. However, states as 
corporate actors can also play roles as it is leaders and foreign policy elites who speaks on behalf of the state. On 
how symbolic interactionist role theory as a micro-level approach can be applied to the meso or macro level i.e. 
states as conceiving and playing roles see, McCourt 2012; 2014; Wehner 2018.  
from a broader social setting in which direct others counterroles are less present to make a role for 
the self (see Turner 1988: 78). Further, role location is the process by which an actor locates a 
suitable role in a social structure by reconciling belief’s about the self as well as beliefs about how 
others view the self (Thies 2012: 29) . Role performance is the actual behavior of actors “(…) in 
terms of characteristic patterns of decisions and actions undertaken in specific situational 
contexts…” (Aggestam 2006: 20). 
The roles we examine in this paper include both social positions in organized groups as 
well as socially recognized categories of actor pertinent to the global political economy.  The labels 
and ordinary language meaning are fairly commonplace, but we define them and the normative 
and behavioural expectations associated with them to add clarity to their use in our analysis.  A 
borrower is an actor that has received money from another with the agreement that it will be repaid 
under certain conditions (e.g., with interest, within a certain period of time). A lender, who is an 
actor that has loaned or organized others to loan money, may impose other conditions on a 
borrower, such as changes in expenditures and revenue generation that are believed to increase the 
ability of the actor to repay. The borrower-lender role relationship is a standard feature of the 
global political economy.   A debtor is an actor that owes debt to another, known as a creditor. 
While borrower and debtor, and lender and creditor denote the same thing, the connotation is 
slightly different in the global political economy.  The use of borrower typically denotes a practice 
and positive appraisal by significant others for the situation of repayment over time, while the use 
of debtor signals potential problems with repayment and a more negative appraisal.  Similarly the 
corresponding use of lender is more positive, while creditor signals potential problems with 
repayment by the debtor. A defaulter is an actor that fails in their obligation to repay debt and it is 
one step further down the negative scale from debtor. In fact, defaulter also involves a sense of 
shame or embarrassement as negative connotations. The corresponding counterrole for a defaulter 
is still a creditor until the situation is resolved.   
One resolution for a debtor in trouble or a defaulter is to adopt the role of a rescued state. 
A rescued state usually requires extraordinary measures by another actor, often a lender of last 
resort, to organize financial support for an actor who can no longer meet its financial obligations 
to repay a debt.  A rescued state is expected to be contrite and confer magnanimity upon the lender 
of last restort. Lender of last resort is a role originally conceived by the economist Charles 
Kindleberger (1986) in his explanation for the need of a hegemon to prevent global depression. 
The lender of last resort steps into non-standard, crisis situations to restore order to the borrowing 
and lending functions of actors. Another resolution for debtors is to adopt the role of economic 
reformer, which is an actor that attempts to resolve underlying economic and financial issues that 
inhibit its ability to repay existing debt and ideally avoid the continued long-term accumulation of 
more debt. While a debtor may adopt the economic reformer as an achieved role, a defaulter or a 
rescued state may have such a role ascribed to them. 
 The way roles are played can change over time. An actor can play the role of lender, but 
depending on the contextual situation the lender can sometimes use different means to impose 
certain conditions on the borrower. Moreover, this conditionality sometimes can be stricter than 
others based on the credibility of the borrower and the quality of the role relationship lender-
borrower. This kind of change in roles can be expressed in nuanced adjustments over time, but it 
can also be more immediate in the global economy as a response to systemic changes such as 
economic crises.  
Crises in the economy are critical junctures in which the agency of leaders often becomes 
key to find solutions, and if necessary redefine the model of economic development and the role 
of the state; that is, engage in role change. The “threat, urgency, and uncertainty involved in a 
crisis not only evokes calls for leadership but also may offer political leaders more scope for 
action” for which, “the Euro Crisis provides a clear case”  (Van Esch 2018: 54).  For instance, 
roles like rescued state and defaulter in contexts of economic crises are certainly ascribed social 
categories on the state experiencing difficulties to fulfill its financial obligations. Ascribed roles 
are given to actors by others, often based on factors outside of their control, while achieved roles 
are those which the actor has chosen themselves (Thies, 2013: 32). The imposition of ascribed 
roles are based on existing rules of the game in the global economy that are executed by 
multilateral institutions, regional groups like the EU, and their member states. Although these roles 
are assigned, states may also try to change them for roles less damaging in terms of reputation such 
as debtor after occupying the rescued state role. A state may fulfill newly acquired financial 
obligations while practising and routinizing a new role of responsible debtor in order to regain 
financial credibility. Change in this case is both materially and socially driven. The defaulter and 
rescued states still enjoy agency to plan realistic payments to the lender or lender of last resort to 
regain credibility and transition to a new role of debtor. In this process the ability of the self to 
change the imposed role based on non-conformity with its performance and aspiration to achieve 
a new role is crucial. This is one of the dimensions of the concept of role distance, in which an 
actor conceives relationally a new role while at the same time the actor distances one’s self from 
a previous existing role (Goffman 1961)2. However, the new role location process may experience 
difficulties as it can be contested and resisted by the audience. This process of role conflict between 
a national role conception and externally defined expectations (Kaarbo and Cantir 2013: 468) may 
                                                          
2 The second dimension of the role distance concept is based on how an actor takes distances from its own existing 
role to find new creative ways to perform that existing role better without incurring in process of role change 
(Goffman 1961). 
even lead to the impossibility of the self to enact the role in practice or changes in behavior as 
actors are socialized into new ways of enacting a role or lead to the selection of a new roles 
altogether (Thies 2013).  
Recent research on role theory has also shown the analytical value of studying the process 
of role formation at the domestic level by turning to instruments of foreign policy analysis (see 
Kaarbo and Cantir 2013). This research shows the formation and enactment of a role involves 
many domestic actors shaping the process. Domestic actors (e.g., governmental agencies and 
bureaucracies, interest groups, legislative) have their own identities, interests and strategies to 
position themselves in the agenda-setting process and impact the role to be formed and played 
(Kaarbo and Cantir 2013: 468). This venue of research on role theory also involves looking into 
how the domestic formation (consensus-divergence) over a role operates and unfolds, as well as 
how actors are included and excluded in the enactment of a role.  
Thus, role theory offers a rich set of conceptual tools whose analytical value are maximized 
in its relational dimension. Although some key concepts in role theory have been presented, its 
conceptual richness goes beyond the concepts herein introduced.3 In particular, role theory’s 
conceptual repertoire has always contained a relational dimension as part of its conceptual 
properties. The relational dimension of role theory offers a more comprehensive approach to IPE 
as most existing theoretical approaches either tend to ignore the relevance of Others for hegemons, 
leaders, lenders, or they do not elaborate on the importance of these roles’ alters for egos’ social 
relationships. It is this relational dimension between ego (self) and alter (other) within an existing 
                                                          
3 For a comprehensive analysis of the role concepts see Harnisch (2011); Thies (2010); and Walker (1987). 
social context that makes roles part of a socially constructed process and thus opens space for role 
theory within the constructivist tradition (Breuning 2017, Breuning 2011, Thies 2010).  
 
 
The neglected past presence of roles in IPE 
 
Role theory’s conceptual apparatus describes how roles are socially constituted. However, role 
theory has not been acknowledged as an approach that can provide a good understanding of IPE 
phenomena—not even with the proliferation of social constructivism in IPE (e.g. Burch and 
Denemark eds. 1997, McNamara 1998, Best 2005, Hobson and Seabrooke eds. 2007, Waever 
2008, Woll 2008, Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons eds. 2010; Johnson 2016). Despite the neglect of 
role theory in social constructivist IPE, symbolic interactionism has always been present in 
political economy even before the constructivist revolution in International Relations and IPE in 
the 1990s. In fact, one can establish a parallel between how a self becomes aware of its social 
surrounding through social interactions with others in the works of the founding father of classical 
political economy, Adam Smith (1982 [1759]), and that of founding father of symbolic 
interactionist role theory, Herbert Mead (1934). In fact, Susan Shott (1976) stresses that Adam 
Smith was the forerunner among the Scottish moralist philosophers of the 18th century and thus 
one of the main precursors of symbolic interactionist ideas and concepts that were later developed 
by Herbert Mead.   
For instance, Adam Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator is similar to Mead’s notion of 
a general other. Both concepts reflect how humans are able to interact with others by putting 
themselves in the shoes of the other, and in this way elucidate the most appropriate pattern of 
behaviour for a social situation. In other words, the concepts of impartial spectator and that of a 
general other are the basic elements to regulate social life within an organised group (Costelloe 
1997). 
In his works The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1982 [1759]) and An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (2007 [1764]), Smith lays the foundations for his 
understanding of a new commercial society as a more desirable order than that of feudalistic 
society.4 For Smith, commercialisation was a key force in breaking down feudalism. As 
commercial societies cement, social order would be achieved through sympathy, which is a method 
of social control (Hill and McCarthy 2007:34-38). Sympathy produces conformity to the 
expectations of others in a society. Sympathy as a condition makes the figure of an impartial 
spectator possible as only through sympathy can one have the abstract capacity to assume the 
other’s perspectives and circumstances. It allows individuals to self-regulate their own “imagined” 
offensive behaviour by imagining the eventual disapproval of others (Shott 1976: 40-41). Self-
regulatory role behaviour and social order emerges as consequence of this process in which the 
self takes the position of an impartial spectator (Costelloe 1997). As one acts in reference to an 
impartial spectator what one develops is amicable relations with strangers or with other social 
actors as pillars of a commercial society. In fact, in some passages of the Wealth of Nations, Adam 
Smith adopts the language of roles in which governments and people have the ability to adopt the 
roles of merchant, manufacturer, lawgiver, farmer, tailor, importer and exporter as well as debtor 
and borrower (see for example Smith 2007[1764]: 293-295, 531-533, 612). For instance, in his 
Book V chapter III on public debts, Smith not only mentions the role-counterrole creditor-debtor 
                                                          
4 From now on this latter work will be mentioned in the text as the Wealth of Nations as popularly known. 
but he also describes the burdens of national debt and backruptcies and the ensuing sense of honor 
or dishonour using the language of roles:  
“But in most countries, the creditors of the public are, the greater part of them, wealthy 
people, who stand more in the relation of creditors than in that of debtors, towards the rest 
of their fellow citizens…When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, 
in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, 
and avowed bankruptcy, is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the 
debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor.” (Smith 2007 [1764]: 608) 
 
Thus, the concept of impartial spectator captures the same process as the notion of a general 
other theorised by Herbert Mead.5 A general other is “[t]he organized community or social group 
which gives to the individual his unity of self (…)”. Mead illustrates his concept of a general other 
by using an example of a person playing baseball: “Each one of his own acts is determined by his 
assumption of the action of others who are playing the game. What he does is controlled by his 
being everyone else on that team, at least in so far as those attitudes affect his own particular 
response” (Mead 1967 [1934]: 154). The general other in this example is the organised attitudes 
of the players that constitute a group as they are involved in the same social process and location. 
A generalised other is an abstract social category to which the self relates to and can be used to 
deduce its most appropriate role (Beneš and Harnisch, 2014).  
Thus, Smith and Mead have similar notions of how an individual becomes a social being—
also later known as role-taking, understood as the ability of the self to put herself in the shoes of 
                                                          
5 On other similarities and overlapping about the relational thought of Smith and Mead, see Costelloe (1997). 
the other (see Mead 1967 [1934]: 152-153; see also MCourt 2014: 14). At the core of role-taking 
is the assumption of a world that is being experienced by humans through role based behaviour 
(see Turner 1962: 21).6 The notion of a impartial spectator (or general other) who constitutes social 
life is foundational to Smith’s understanding of a commercial society. Although the Wealth of 
Nations focuses more on notions of self-interest and commercial exchanges between individuals 
of a society, Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is the framework for developing a market 
economy. This latter work concentrates on the need of creating institutions that secure the 
prevalence of sympathy and exchanges among strangers in a market economy by relying on the 
social mechanism of impartial spectatorship (cf. Harcourt 1995: 230). 
 
Identity and roles in IPE 
 
Constructivists seek to elucidate how social facts influence patterns of political economy as a 
social object as well as how agents interpret their surrounding material reality (Abdelal 2009: 63). 
IPE was influenced by the constructivist debate within traditional IR, especially by the work of 
Alexander Wendt (1999). Wendt’s work highlighted the importance of the social co-constitution 
of structures and agency and how social interaction is the key to the type of world in which actors 
live (i.e. Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian anarchy). However, Wendt’s (1999: 184-185) approach 
is still predominantly structurally oriented, despite his insistence on the co-constitution of structure 
                                                          
6 Role-taking only captures a part of the social behavior of actors as the self still enjoys its own creativity to innovate 
and adjust its role performances as actors try to coordinate their actions with those of others. As actors play roles, 
they also take part in a process of role-making, which is the improvisation of “some features of our behavior in order 
to construct a role performance that fits with the performance of others while also remaining attuned to our personal 
goals and inclinations.” (Sandstrom, Martin and Fine 2010: 150). 
and agency. Yet, new approaches to constructivism moved beyond structural determinism. Such 
studies examine the co-constitution of identity, norms, beliefs and practices of actors, as well as 
their behavioural manifestations (e.g. Finnemore 1996, Hopf 2002, Jackson 2006).  
Role theory differs in its understanding of identity from constructivism. Whereas both 
terms are related, they also have their own conceptual properties. Ironically, given the 
constructivist emphasis on agents and structures, identity limits agency since it does not have 
action as one of its conceptual properties (Wehner and Thies 2014). Identity cannot determine the 
interests a state pursues in the international system without having action as one of its conceptual 
properties (McCourt 2011: 7). The identity and actions problem is also recreated in IPE. For 
example, economic nationalism is conceptualized as any economic policy promoted by national 
identity; that is, the latter as key driver for economic-policy making (Helleiner 2005: 225). Identity 
requires the use of roles to link identity and action through motivational dispositions. In fact, roles 
are identity markers for external others. Roles allow us to describe a context based interaction in a 
specific place and time. What others see is not the full identity of an actor but a role being 
performed (debtor, lender, leader or follower) that creates for the other a set of expectations on 
how the self is likely to behave. In other words, an actor rarely ever brings its full identity into an 
interaction with another actor. Roles, as its metaphorical meaning suggest, involve a dramaturgical 
dimension or the display of how well an actor performs a given role. Identity lacks that 
performativity and dramaturgical dimension because it lacks action and a stage upon which to 
perform who the actor is and what it wants.7  
                                                          
7 Economic sociology has also focused on the performativity of economic actors and their agency capacity to construct 
social economic situations, and perform dramaturgical acts to understand and make sense of political economic issues 
(see e.g. MacKenzie 2009; Callon 2006; Knorr Cetina 2009). Future studies on the performative dimension of role 
could develop synergies between studies that develop the argument that economics is performative, and role theory is 
Identity within most conventional social constructivist accounts does not need a 
counterpart or a counterrole; that is, the self acts to self-reinforce its own identity as the other is 
only a static depiction lacking agency to attribute expectation to the self (Wehner and Thies 2014; 
McCourt 2014). Instead, in role theory a self always needs the other to construct a role. For 
instance, in a context of economic crises a self always needs the counterrole of the other and to 
locate these roles via performativity in a given context. Thus, a debtor always needs a lender to 
exist and leader needs a follower or vice versa in a social context. Even a defaulter or a rescued 
state needs others’ roles to ascribe a role (not an identity) on the self since they outline normative 
expectations for their behaviour. Such actors may then establish creative means of role distance to 
seek role change to re-establish a reputation as a trustworthy and responsible debtor.  
Moreover, structural constructivisms tend to see identity as largely separate from roles as 
the former is an intrinsic property rather than one created through interaction with other actors in 
the existing social environment (e.g. Hopf 2002, 2012; Wendt 1999). Agents are the “primitive 
units of analysis” in this type of constructivism. Demonstrating such agency requires “showing 
them making choices from a menu of structurally provided options” (Jackson 2006: 141-142).  
Agents thus “cease to exercise effective identity” in such accounts that often rely on socialization 
or internalization mechanisms that link agents and structures (e.g. Schimmelfennig 1998). The 
self-side of the story becomes paramount to establishing identity without necessarily incorporating 
the Other. For example, Hopf (2002: 263) suggests that identities are a domestically driven process 
that need not require interaction with an Other. Hopf’s (2012: 5) subsequent “societal 
                                                          
also about performative acts. In fact, roles are drawn from the theater metaphor of actors playing roles on a stage (see 
Thies 2010).  
constructivist” approach argued that Soviet foreign policy from 1945 to 1958 can be explained by 
expressions of Soviet identity present in novels and films.  
Relational constructivisms sidestep the primitive agent found in structural constructivism 
by focusing on the “practical activities” and “rhetorical commonplaces” that (re)produce actors in 
a social environment. Role theory and relational constructivism share a commitment to 
understanding how both agents and structures emerge from social relations, but relational 
constructivism is only slightly less structural than structural constructivists. For example, in his 
analysis of the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, Jackson (2006: 145) notes that identity was 
a key feature of the rhetorical commonplaces used in public debates. Democracy and associated 
values of peace and human rights were deployed against sovereignty—democracy and sovereign 
statehood both being types of identities, as well as “nested” identities associated with Western 
civilization and even humanity.  These identities are understood to justify and legitimate actions, 
though we suggest they are missing the central feature of the role to connect identity and action. 
Tellingly, Jackson’s (2006: 146-147) analysis requires a second layer of legitimation—references 
to the national interest as a way to provide the connection between identities invoked in rhetoric 
and action for the Self. Instead, roles already contain expectations of the Self and Other that 
provide an agreed upon set of interests and a normative justification for action.  
Within the relational constructivist landscape, international practice theory as advanced by 
Pouliot (2010), Adler (2011), and Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) focuses on how everyday 
situations are significant in (re)-producing social life (Adler-Nissen 2016a: 91-92). “Practices are 
socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, 
simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and 
on the material world.” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6). This literature assumes that unconscious 
everyday practices as habitus and commonsensical routines are key to understanding the social 
world and thus world politics (McCourt 2016). Practice theory seeks to unpack mundane and taken 
for granted situations that construct and structure the social world (Adler-Nissen 2016a). Adler-
Nissen (2016b) links international practice theory to symbolic interactionism as she reexamines 
the latter’s roots in social constructivism to get new insights into the study of power and identity 
from an angle of everyday situations. Both power and identity are conceived and reproduced 
through routinezed practices, which are mainly analyzed from a self perspective This work 
reproduces some of the shortcomings of relational constructivism and its understanding of identity 
as the latter is constructued and reproduced through self-practice in which the expectations of 
others become only a passive voice, despite stressing its relational dimension of a self and other. 
Agency is not just about the self conception side but it is also about focusing on the expectations 
of others (see Wehner and Thies 2014).  
However, the work of Adler-Nissen (2016b) opens a space for a fruitful dialogue between 
roles and practice. In fact, one of the main contributions of sociologist Ervin Goffmann (1967) to 
role theory symbolic interactionism is the importance of routine practices in the form of rituals 
that permeates every day life. For Turner (1988: 95), Goffmann’s work “was the first to recognize 
that everyday life is punctuated with rituals that mark group membership and that structure the 
sequencing of everyday interaction”.8 Thus, roles as part of symbolic interactionism has a place in 
this eventual theorization of roles as practices and/or practices as roles; especially on how a self 
and other establish and develop practices and emotions such as embarrassement, pride and anger 
                                                          
8 In symbolic interactionist role theory, the notion of structure does not imply determinist behavior as actors can still 
innovate and improvise on their role scripts and performances as the concept of role-making describes along with the 
role-taking process. 
(Adler-Nissen 2016b: 38), when conceiving, negotiating and attributing roles in the role location 
process.  
However, roles should not be reduced to everyday practices as roles can provide not only 
a good account of daily habits, but also of big political events in world politics; something that 
international practice theory lacks. In this sense, role theory and its concepts of master role as the 
most salient attribute of an actor such as great power, small power, regional power, global hegemon 
with auxiliary roles such as leader, mediator, security provider, bridge builder, lender, borrower 
and so on can be a way to capture the interplay of social structures and the agency side of roles as 
a form of practice in international politics (see Wehner 2015; Thies 2013). Moreover, a symbolic 
interactionist role approach can also shedlight on some of the other shortcomings of the theory of 
practice.  In fact, theory of practice has been criticized for being unable to account for change (see 
Hopf 2018). The study of role change in foreign policy (Wehner 2018) can also provide a plausible 
way to study the change of practices and perfomances through the notions of role-learning 
(Harnisch 2012) and role distance (Goffmann 1961).  
While role theory and the aforementioned constructivist approaches to identity may often 
be at odds, they do share a similar methodological outlook (see Broome 2013; Lupovici 2009).  
From this similar methodological outlook role theorists have studied roles from a historical 
interpretive perspective (McCourt 2014), or using process tracing (Kaarbo and Cantir 2013), while 
Wehner and Thies (2014) and Wehner (2018) shows how narratives are a good fit for role theory 
methodological development. Thus, we draw upon on this narrative-based approach for use with 
role theory as it also fits comfortably with the aforementioned features of constructivist IPE. 
Narratives are understood as strategies constructed by political agents that speak on behalf of actors, 
whether people, non-state or state actors, to frame and cast roles and achieve specific goals and interests 
(see Wehner 2018; Wehner and Thies 2014). Thus, narratives are not spontaneous and randomly 
chosen, as political agents must draw on cultural resources that will resonate within their society and 
across the societies of significant Others (Ringmar 1996).  
In the following section, we provide an illustration of the application of role theory to the study 
of economic crisis.  As we have shown above, the use of roles is as old as the field of classical political 
economy and is quite similar to how symbolic interactionists conceived of them in the development of 
sociological role theory.  Further, roles move us beyond constructivist approaches to identity, which 
tend to retain too much structural emphasis and do not provide enough room for agent-driven choices 
and behaviour. Roles also provide motivational disposition and the intent to act in a way that 
constructivist approaches to identity lack.  Moreover, a role theory lens is also able to capture the big 
events of world politics such as the economic crises in the Eurozone and the day-to-day reactions 
and performances (as practices) from the different actors involved in the crisis. Thus, particulary in 
short-term analyses of IPE, roles help us to understand how aspects of identity affect state decision 
making and behaviour. 
 
 
The Greek Problem and the EU Economic Crisis 
 
Greece experienced a financial crisis in 2009 that was a consequence of both malfunctioning 
domestic fiscal and economic policies and exposure to the global financial crisis triggered in the 
US in 2008. Against this backdrop, Greece experienced severe economic problems and enacted 
the roles of borrower, debtor and rescued state with the EU financial institutions and its member 
states, and especially with Germany as the strongest state in financial matters (Bulmer 2014). The 
rescued state role prevented Greece from becoming and enacting the role of defaulter. Greece’s 
significant others also included multilateral organizations such as the IMF and extra- EU states 
such as the US as the global hegemon. Thus, the Greek financial problem and its need to be rescued 
created different sets of role relationships and expectations at the domestic, state, regional (EU) 
and the international level. 
 Although Greece had severe fiscal problems, the change of government in October 2009 
provided the political opening to start to locate a role as a borrower and then as a rescued state. 
The new prime minister, George Papandreou, and his cabinet from the PASOK (socialist) party, 
especially, his finance minister, George Papakonstantinou, were key in narrating the dimensions 
of the crisis to the population and to the audience of potential lenders. The purpose of the narrations 
were to secure political viability for the difficult economic adjustments within a frame of strong 
domestic and parliamentary role contestation, as well as to gain external support among the 
reluctant potential lenders (see Papandreou 2018). In fact, a few days after taking the post, 
Papandreou made clear that the public debt was higher than the 3,6% that the previous government 
claimed. The new government upgraded the number to 12,8% of GDP (Featherstone 2011).  
 
 
Well, yes, we do have first of all a home-grown problem, which was the 
mismanagement of our economy, particularly by the previous government – 
corruption, cronyism, playing (unclear) politics. A lot of money was wasted, basically, 
through these types of practices. So we need to make some real, deep structural 
changes, as, of course, dealing with the immediate problem of the deficit. (Papandreou 
2010a).  
 
This narrative showed the official authorities’ strategy to cast a role of economic reformer 
at the domestic level and blame the previous government in order to reduce the sense of 
embarrasment from the government and the reactions of anger from the Greek people (Davou and 
Demertzis 2013) as reductions of wages, public sector positions and pension schemes were seen 
as way to reduce the practice of increasing public debt that brought the economy to a crisis. Thus, 
the crisis and narrative of the inevitability of domestic reforms provided the frame for conducting 
adjustments and enacting a domestic role of economic reformer by the new government. In 
addition, the narrative of blaming the previous government also allowed locating the role of 
economic reformer, despite strong domestic contestation at the civil society level, especially in the 
public sector (Lyrintzis 2011).  
Thus, the prime minister Papandreou was a key actor to contain the sense of embarrasment 
and anger of the Greek people and the state by generating practices of passing the blame of the 
current economic situation to his predecessor (e.g. Papendreou 2010b). This role of economic 
reformer was possible to enact since prime minister Papandreou was also making sense of the role 
expectations of others. Role expectations on Greece to enact the role of economic reformer as the 
most appropriate role for the current situation took the form of social cues coming from the global 
economic system (impartial spectator/general other) as well as a role that was negotiated with 
Germany and the EU institutions in the role location process (Matthijs and McNamara 2015: 235-
237; Schmidt 2014). 
 
Role expectations come also from credit rating agencies such as Fitch and Standard & 
Poor’s signalled in their role of financial evaluators to the global markets on the danger of Greece 
becoming a defaulter by giving it “junk status” in April 2010 (Featherstone 2011: 200). 
Papandreou asked to keep access to credit under the same interest rates afforded to other EU 
members, making clear the access to credit was necessary for Greece. Increasing Greece’s debt 
was seen as the most immediate solution by the government to prevent a role change from a debtor 
to a defaulter role, as the defaulter role was to be ascribed by the global financial system with clear 
negative reputational damage. Prime Minister Papandreou tried not to refer to a financial rescue 
as such and at the same time argued for the potential contagion effect to the rest of Europe if 
measures from the EU were not taken regarding Greece. In fact, Papandreou refers to the Greek 
economic situation as the result of a common practice that was developed and routinized within 
the Eurozone. In  his narrative he shows potential lenders and leaders of the European Union that 
he was willing to enact the role of economic reformer but at the same time he made clear that 
Greece only followed the expectations of private economic agents and countries from the EU in 
its policy of borrowing. This policy of borrower was nothing new and unique but a common 
practice within the Eurozone (see Papandreou 2018, Papandreou 2010b). Papandreou also 
expressed his expectations of enacting the role of rescued state if the eventual repayments to 
lenders of last resorts were to be kept under similar interests rates along with other borrowers from 
the Eurozone. The new Greek government had also the intention of keeping similar borrowing 
conditions as before in order to minimise the fear and anger of the Greek population that was 
experiencing the negative effects of domestic economic reforms.  
 
A second fallacy is that the problem is only Greek…However, there is a fear of 
contagion. Higher interest rates for us in borrowing mean higher interest rates for 
others in Europe, and that undermines the growth potential of our economies, the 
credibility of the European economy, and of course creates problems with currencies 
(…) what we are saying is simply that we would like to be able to borrow on the same 
terms as other countries in the European Union and the Eurozone. (Papandreou 2010c). 
 
Reactions to the possibility of bailing out Greece evolved from reluctance to acceptance, 
especially in Germany where German citizens did not support a financial rescue. Further, 
Chancellor Merkel was also facing electoral constraints as a commitment on supporting Greece 
was perceived to have diminished the electoral chances of Christian Democrats (CDU) in key 
elections in North Rhine Westphalia on May 2010 (Speigel Online 2010a; Schmidt 2014). Thus, 
day to day role contestation from domestic actors on whether or not the German government 
should enact the role of lender is consistent with the initial hesitation of Germany in taking a 
subsequent leader role in the economic crisis situation of Greece. Moreover, the German 
government initial reluctance is also based on prioritising the practice of domestic politics rather 
than fulfilling the role expectations of others such as the EU institutions and PIGS states (Bulmer 
2014: 1259). The expectations of both impartial spectator (general other) and direct others such as 
Greece, the European Central Bank, the EU Commission and the audience of European states have 
to do with the recognition of Germany as holding a leader role in matters of EU integration, usually 
in tandem with France (see Paterson 2011). Moreover, these expections from others are also based 
on the memory of others that have interacted in day to day activities with Germany within the EU 
and in which Germany enacts one of the leader roles within this institution. At the same time, we 
can also observe not only the attribution of expectations based routinized practices, but also on 
existing social hierarchies. Germany holds the master role of a regional power in Europe from 
where others actors base their expectations about Germany enacting other auxiliary roles that make 
sense of its master role such as leader and lender of last resort in an economic crisis.  
The reluctance of Germany to play the role of lender also reduced the capacity of reaction 
and coordination of EU institutions such as the Economic and Financial Council (Ecofin) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) (Featherstone 2011). In fact, Germany’s initial position was that 
Greece should turn to the IMF for financial support instead. What changed Angela Merkel’s 
position was the recognition that German banks would experience financial problems if Greece 
became a defaulter; something that Greece also made clear when it stressed that the economic 
problem was not only a Greek problem, but instead a common practice of other European states 
of incurring in borrowing practices that can lead to unsustainable debts. In this role relationship 
between Greece and Germany, it was Greece that exerted its agency to assign Germany the role 
that was central to re-establish the financial order of the system. Germany was seen as the actor 
that could re-establish social order within the Eurozone and in that was it could contribute to re-
establish Greece’s financial order and credibility. In this sense, hierarchies are social and are made 
of relational practices in which both ordering and expected subordinate actor enjoy enough agency 
to construct the relational hierarchical relationship (see Adler-Nissen 2017) 
At the same time, increasing role expectations on Germany also made the location of a role 
of lender of last resort for Greece possible. For instance, the ECB also verbalised their role 
expectations on Germany not providing enough leadership in the crisis as one of its board members 
openly criticised Germany for its stance on the issue. “If the IMF steps in, the image of the euro 
would be that of a currency that is able to survive only with the external support of an international 
organization” (Bini Smaghi in Spiegel Online 2010b). Yet, the decisive step to support a bailout 
and enacting the role of lender in a rather reluctant way was that German banks developed long 
term habits of playing the role of borrowers and then creditors of the so-called PIGS countries, 
which included Greece.9 By lending money to these countries Germany was promoting demand 
for its own exports (Rajan 2010). This chaotic situation developed in a process oriented way 
through the interaction private lenders (German banks) and debtors (Greece government and 
financial institutions). In fact, German private banks and bondholders along with French private 
financial institutions have been attributed part of the responsibility for creating the conditions for 
a financial crisis in Greece and Europe (see Moravsick 2012: 58; Jacobi 2014: 77) as the practice 
of the role relationship of lender-borrower evolved towards one of creditor-debtor. In this sense, it 
seems to be the case that private institutions and Greece continued enacting and practicing these 
roles in the previous years and months of the crises without being conscious of the eventual risks 
of keeping this incremental practice of creditor-borrower. Role change can unfold in a rather 
ubiquitous manner as actors are sometimes unaware of how a recurrent practice can lead to a 
different situation from the existing daily practice (see Wehner and Thies 2014, Wehner 2018). 
Thus, despite the domestic unpopularity of rescuing Greece, Germany decided to do so because of 
domestic pressures from financial private actors via existing EU institutions and with the presence 
of the IMF to partially relieve the financial burden to the EU. Merkel preferred to rescue Greece 
and not her own financial system if other countries would fall in a sort of domino effect 
(Featherstone 2011). Consistent with interpretations of international practice theory (see Nissen-
                                                          
9 The PIGS acronym was coined by financial rating institutions to refer to Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain as 
having the potential to face severe financial problems. 
Adler 2016a), the lender of last resort role can be seen as a practice to restore order in the 
Eurozone.  
In this process of locating the role of lender of last resort on the German side and debtor 
and rescued state on the Greek side, there is also the location of the role of leader for Germany. 
This process of locating the role of leader was also domestically contested as shown above. 
However, Chancellor Merkel came to terms to the idea of Germany providing leadership to prevent 
the eventual widespread of the economic crisis. At the same time, the construction of the role of 
leader shows how Germany has made of this role a practice within the EU project. The practice of 
a leader role also matches the expectations of others on Germany as a recurrent routine. Germany 
is always expected to provide leadership along with France to advance regional integration and 
when integration is at risk due to critical events such as the economic crisis of Greece and the 
eventual contagion to the rest of Europe. In fact, Paterson (2011:72-73) concludes that the 
German’s actions and behaviour during the Eurozone crisis catapulted this country into taking a 
role of a (reluctant) hegemon. 
As Germany started to perfomed the role of leader in a more convincing way after initial 
hesitation now following the demands of the situation and expectations of others states in the EU, 
Germany along with the EU institution was able to locate its role of lender of last resort. In the 
EU Council Meeting on 26 March 2010, the EU states decided to provide financial means to 
Greece if this was necessary. In such meeting the IMF was also an actor as the agreement provided 
that it would deliver one-third of the financial package and the EU members two-thirds of the total 
rescue plan. In April 2010, Greece asked for a bailout from the EU, which meant the adoption with 
zeal and completion of the role location process to form the role relationship of rescued state (and 
subsequently debtor) by Greece and lender of last resort by the IMF, the EU, Germany, France, 
Italy and other EU governments.10 Thus, the role of lender of last resort was enacted in a joint 
manner by EU states and the IMF, but its enactment also involved a hierarchy showing the role 
relationship leader and followers between EU states.  
 Further, the US was part of an active audience for these processes of role location and 
enactment. In fact, Chancellor Merkel and President Obama were in contact during the process of 
casting the role of lender (Spiegel Online 2010b). First, the US assumed in a rather tangential way 
the role of lender via its key membership and financial contribution to the IMF. Second, once the 
role relationship lender-borrower was completed, the US also validated these roles as the global 
hegemon and thus as a social actor whose role is to contribute to sustain the existing social order, 
but also in its need to achieve stability for its own financial system that put the US economic 
recovery in jeopardy. Vice-president Joe Biden referred to the new role relationship between the 
EU and its members states and Greece in the following terms:  
 
And today, President Obama and I are closely following the economic and financial 
crisis in Greece and the European Union’s efforts to deal with it. We welcome the 
support package that Europe is considering, in conjunction the International Monetary 
Fund. And we will be supportive both directly and through the IMF of your efforts as 
you rescue Greece (The White House  2010). 
 
                                                          
10 Out of the 80 billions involved by the EU, the major contributors were Germany with 27,9 % of the total, France 
with 21%, and Italy with 18,4% (Featherstone  2011: 203).  
Thus, the role relationship established between Germany and Greece shows some 
particularities as Germany enacted the role of lender with other states from the EU, with EU 
institutions, the IMF and the US in a joint manner. Moreover, the way the role relationship was 
created and performed shows in part the sui generis dimension of the EU model of integration, 
thus the lender role can be performed on the international stage in different ways. Further, Greece 
was also active in setting the stage to be rescued as the new government was able to navigate the 
constellation of domestic actors contesting the role of reformer and the casting of Greece as a 
rescued state. At the same time, the new Greek government was able to reduce the sense of 
emebarrasment by blaming the previous government as well as the fear and anger that the role of 
economic reformer produced in the Greek population. In addition, transnational actors such as 
financial rating institutions also were important in attributing certain expectations to Greece as a 
potential rescued state. Yet Greece had enough agency capacity to show the audience of states the 
negative effects of potentially enacting the role of defaulter of the global financial system. Thus, 
the Greek government negotiated the terms of a new role relationship with the EU institutions and 
Germany of a rescued state as an extreme form of a borrower, followed by the subsequent 
relationship of debtor-creditor followed by a more routinized practice of debtor-lender as Greece 
started to fulfil its subsequent debt payments in a responsible manner.  
In this sense, roles are manifestations of agreements over actors’ expectations expressed as 
a set of practices and  normative justifications for relational actions between the Self and Other. 
Greece needed to decide what role it wanted to pursue as manifestation of its own domestic 
practices and crisis (economic reformer or defaulter or rescued state), just as Germany needed to 
construct and locate whether and how it would play the role of lender of last resort.  Until those 
domestic-level decisions were made, there were no possibilities for the international level 
interactions that formed the ultimate role relationships. Thus, role theory analysis gives agency to 
Greece in the making of the role relationship as much as it does to Germany, the EU institutions 





This article demonstrates how symbolic interactionist role theory has always had a home in 
constructivist IPE by showing the existing relational dimension in the works of classical political 
economist Adam Smith and by establishing a link between Smith’s work and that of the founding 
father of symbolic interactionism, Herbert Mead. While Smith describes the principle of sympathy 
that makes the social mechanism of impartial spectatorship possible, Mead presents the process of 
role-taking of an actor by one’s own capacity to follow the social cues and demands from a 
generalised other. In fact, impartial spectatorship and a generalised other capture the same social 
process by which a person is able to put himself or herself in the shoes of the other to elucidate his 
or her most appropiate patterns of role behaviour in a given social context. In other words, classical 
political economy as well as IPE have always had a relational dimension that this article brings 
back in to the study of roles in IPE. 
Moreover, this work also demonstrates that role theory could be usefully applied to the 
issues and puzzles that occupy IPE scholars. More specifically, role theory can provide a better 
understanding than traditional constructivist notions of identity when it comes to short term and 
context based social interactions. In fact, identity shows its limitations when one speaks of Greece 
as a rescued state and defaulter. While these two social categories were imposed by the global and 
financial markets as Greece could not fulfil its financial obligations as borrower, it is hard to think 
that Greece would willingly develop an identity as a rescued state and defaulter. These two 
ascribed roles did not mean that Greece ceased to exert its agency as it navigated structural 
constraints to find ways to access loans and plan repayment of its debts by establishing a borrower 
and rescued state role relationship with lenders of last resort such as Germany, the EU and the 
IMF. If identity were instead the analytical lens used in this case, such an approach would have 
started by analysing Greece as an advanced developing state or Southern European economy. Yet, 
these identities (if they can be taken as identities after all) still do not capture the type of cultural 
materials and behavioural orientations Greece was pursuing into its own debt trap. Advanced 
developing state or Southern European economy does not tell us much about the actions of a state 
like Greece in a context of economic crises. Neither of these “identities” provide room to include 
what others expectations are either. Instead, roles improve on identities since they carry 
expectations from others, whether it is the global market providing or a significant other such as 
the EU or Germany providing cues for Greece.  
The achieved role of borrower is a socially acceptable role that most actors enact in the 
global economy, especially when encouraged by potential lenders. In this sense, a debtor – creditor 
role relationship is associated with a previous role location process of identifying borrower and 
lender roles. A key role expectation from creditors and the global economic system is that debtors 
are responsible actors who willingly and systematically fulfill their obligations of repayment. 
However, as states start to experience negative economic conditions that come from global markets 
or domestic society, they may start to experience difficulties in fulfilling their financial 
commitmments. Thus, states experiencing severe crises risk being attributed and even suffer 
imposition of the role of  defaulter, which is seen negatively by all actors.  
Our case also illustrates a variety of roles that complement the different role relationships 
enacted by states in the global political economy. Greece experienced role change shaped by the 
context of a severe economic crisis, but there was not enough international or societal pressure to 
trigger change. Instead the key driving force of prime ministers as leaders explained the role 
change. Greece sought the role of borrower and rescued state in a role relationship with the EU to 
prevent default. Greece used the risk of defaulting as a pressure mechanism to receive financial 
aid from the EU and the IMF. If Greece were to default, the reputational damage would have also 
accrued to the EU and the overall project of monetary integration. In this context, Germany played 
the roles of leader within the EU and lender of last resort, with the entire set of role relationships 
approved by the US as global hegemon. In our case we also see the performance of roles of Greece 
and Germany as a set of practices as well as practices as making roles for the self and other in this 
role relationship.  
Some of the aforementioned roles have global resonance in constructivist and even in more 
rational based IPE approaches.  Borrower, debtor, defaulter, rescued state, creditor, lender of last 
resort are all roles played by many states over time.  These roles are negotiated at home and abroad, 
and have important implications for state behavior.  These socially constructed roles are a real 
component of the global political economy—as real as any material “fact” that IPE scholars are 
used to analyzing. Thus, role theory provides a rich vocabulary and array of conceptual tools for 
those interested in identity-based IPE approaches. Role theory provides a way to consider the co-
constitution of both agents and structures that constructivists desire, and a way to examine the 
behavioural effects of identity that more causally-oriented scholars are inclined to study. We hope 
this article has illustrated how to move forward with a role theoretic approach to understanding 
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